Saturday, June 08, 2013

Analyzing Yahoo's PRISM non-denial

Today, Yahoo's General Counsel posted a carefully worded denial regarding the company's alleged participation in the NSA PRISM program. To the casual observer, it might seem like a categorical denial. I do not believe that Yahoo's denial is as straightforward as it seems.

Below, I have carefully parsed Yahoo's statement, line by line, in order to highlight the fact that Yahoo has not in fact denied receiving court orders under 50 USC 1881a (AKA FISA Section 702) for massive amounts of communications data.


We want to set the record straight about stories that Yahoo! has joined a program called PRISM through which we purportedly volunteer information about our users to the U.S. government and give federal agencies access to our user databases. These claims are false. [emphasis added]

No one has claimed that the PRISM program is voluntary. As the Director of National Intelligence has confirmed, the PRISM program involves court orders granted using Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

By falsely describing PRISM as a voluntary scheme, Yahoo's general counsel is then able to deny involvement outright. Very sneaky.

Yahoo! has not joined any program in which we volunteer to share user data with the U.S. government. We do not voluntarily disclose user information.
Again, PRISM has nothing to do with voluntary disclosures. These are compelled disclosures, pursuant to an order from the FISA court.
The only disclosures that occur are in response to specific demands.
The government can make a specific demand for information about all communications coming to or from a particular country. This is an empty statement.
And, when the government does request user data from Yahoo!, we protect our users.
Claiming to "protect our users" means nothing.
We demand that such requests be made through lawful means and for lawful purposes. We fight any requests that we deem unclear, improper, overbroad, or unlawful.
When the law allows blanket surveillance, "lawful means and lawful purposes" doesn't mean anything.
We carefully scrutinize each request, respond only when required to do so, and provide the least amount of data possible consistent with the law.
When a FISA court order demands blanket surveillance, responding only when required to do so is an empty promise, as is providing the least amount of data possible.
The notion that Yahoo! gives any federal agency vast or unfettered access to our users’ records is categorically false.

Elsewhere in the post, Yahoo's uses the terms "user data" and "user information". Why the sudden switch to the term "users' records"? This seems to deny participation in a Section 215 metadata disclosure program (see: the Verizon Business order revealed earlier this week), which has nothing to do with PRISM.

In any case, the PRISM scandal is not about unfettered access to users' data. It is about giving the government data in which one party of the communication is not in the US. Yahoo is not accused of giving the government unfettered access to communications where all parties are in the US.

Of the hundreds of millions of users we serve, an infinitesimal percentage will ever be the subject of a government data collection directive.
Note the use of the word directive in this statement, which does not mean voluntary. Now see below.
Where a request for data is received, we require the government to identify in each instance specific users and a specific lawful purpose for which their information is requested.
Here, Yahoo switches to using the term "requests" which are voluntary, not demands. The government is not obligated to describe "a specific legal purpose" when it has obtained a court order compelling the disclosure of data. It is only when the government is making a voluntary request of Yahoo that the company has the ability to set terms for the disclosure.
Then, and only then, do our employees evaluate the request and legal requirements in order to respond—or deny—the request.
Yahoo has flexibility when the government makes a request for data. The company has far less flexibility when it receives a court order demanding the disclosure of data.
We deeply value our users and their trust, and we work hard everyday to earn that trust and, more importantly, to preserve it.
If that were true, Yahoo would protect the privacy and security of its customers by enabling HTTPS by default for Yahoo Mail. Yahoo was the last big email provider to even offer HTTPS as an opt-in option, and has still not enabled it by default.

Saturday, November 24, 2012

A few words on patronage

Over the past couple years, I've taken several big companies to task for their woeful privacy and security practices. Just as it is important to call out these flaws, I believe it is also important to give companies credit when they go the extra mile to protect their customers.

When Google began protecting Gmail with HTTPS by default, I praised the company. When it started voluntarily publishing statistics for government requests, I again praised the company. When AT&T protected its customers' voicemail accounts from caller ID spoofing by forcing users to enter PINs, I praised the company. When Twitter asked the government to unseal the 2703(d) order that it had obtained as part of its investigation into Wikileaks, I praised the company. When Facebook started to offer HTTPS, and then this month enabled it by default, I praised the company. When Mozilla switched to encrypted search by default for Firefox, I praised the organization.

You get the idea.

Of course, just because I praise a particular action by a company, it doesn't mean that I am suddenly giving the company or its products my seal of approval. As an example, I'm of course glad that Facebook is enabling transport encryption to protect its customers' communications from network based interception. That doesn't mean I suddenly love Facebook, or bless the company's other business practices. Turning on HTTPS by default is a great move, but it isn't enough to get me to open a Facebook account, or trust the company with my data.

It is unfortunate then that I must defend myself against Nadim Kobeissi's latest attempt at reputation assassination.

Earlier this month, I praised Silent Circle for the company's fantastic law enforcement compliance policy. [Silent Circle sent me an early draft of their policy, sought feedback, and even accepted some of my suggestions]. Compared to the industry norm, in which companies merely disclose that they will hand over their customers' data to the government when forced to do so, Silent Circle's policy is an absolutely stellar example of the ways in which companies can approach this issue in a clear, transparent and honest manner.

I have spent several years researching the ways in which law enforcement agencies force service providers to spy on their customers. Most companies are not willing to discuss their law enforcement policies, let alone publish them online. It is for that reason that I praised Silent Circle - because they have set a great example that I hope other companies will follow.

However, as with the numerous other examples I highlighted above, just because I praise a particular action by a company, it doesn't mean that I now stand behind the company or its products.

Although I have praised Silent Circle's legal policies, I've made no public statements regarding the technical merits of their products. When I've been questioned by journalists about the extent to which consumers should trust the company's technology, I've been consistently conservative. As I recently told Ryan Gallagher at Slate:

Christopher Soghoian, principal technologist at the ACLU's Speech Privacy and Technology Project, said he was excited to see a company like Silent Circle visibly competing on privacy and security but that he was waiting for it to go open source and be audited by independent security experts before he would feel comfortable using it for sensitive communications.

Nadim has suggested that I am endangering my independence and that I have some kind of conflict of interest regarding Silent Circle, possibly because the company loaned me an iPod Touch so that I could get a chance to try out the iOS version of their software while they work out the kinks in the Android version. (How does Nadim even know the company loaned me an iPod? Because I disclosed it in a discussion with him on a public mailing list.)

Let me be perfectly clear. I am not a consultant to Silent Circle or any other company. I am not on an advisory board for Silent Circle or any other company. The only employer I have is the American Civil Liberties Union. Yes, I regularly talk with people who work at the company, and offer suggestions for ways that they can better protect the privacy of their customers. However, I regularly give solicited (and even more frequently, unsolicited) feedback to many companies, big and small. Most ignore me, but some occasionally change their practices. I am a privacy activist, and that is what I do.

Wednesday, August 08, 2012

Responding to Wired's ad hominem hatchet job

I have long been a fan of Wired's coverage of privacy and security issues, particularly the insightful reporting and analysis by Ryan Singel, currently the editor of the Threat Level blog. It is for that reason that I am saddened to see Ryan stoop to twisting my words in support of a lengthy character assassination piece targeted against me.

Brief background

Two weeks ago, Wired published a glowing, 2000 word story by Quinn Norton about CryptoCat, an encrypted chat tool. Quinn was not the first journalist to shower praise upon Cryptocat -- writers at the New York Times and Forbes had previously done so too.

I subsequently published a lengthy blog post, which compared the media's coverage of Cryptocat, a relatively new, unproven security tool, to the media's previous fawning coverage of Haystack, a tool which, once analyzed by experts, was revealed to be pure snakeoil.

The message in my blog post -- that journalists risk exposing their readers to harm when they hype unproven security technologies -- was directed at the media as a whole. In support of my argument, I cited glowing praise for such technologies printed in the Guardian, the New York Times, Newsweek, Forbes and, Wired.

Today, Ryan Singel, the editor at Wired's Threat Level blog responded to my blog post, but incorrectly frames my criticism as if it were solely directed at Quinn Norton and her coverage of Cryptocat. In doing so, Ryan inaccurately paints me as a sexist, security-community insider who is unfairly criticizing a tool "created by an outsider to the clubby crypto community and one that’s written up by a woman and reviewed by a female security expert."

The importance of dissenting technical experts

One of the biggest criticisms of Norton's story I expressed in my blog post of was the fact that she did not quote a single technical expert that was critical of Cryptocat, even though there are quite a few who have been vocal with their concerns:

Other than Kobeissi, Norton's only other identified sources in the story are Meredith Patterson, a security researcher that was previously critical of Cryptocat who is quoted saying "although [Cryptocat] got off to a bumpy start, he’s risen to the occasion admirably" and an unnamed active member of Anonymous, who is quoted saying "if it's a hurry and someone needs something quickly, [use] Cryptocat."
As I also noted in my post:
Even though their voices were not heard in the Wired profile, several prominent experts in the security community have criticized the web-based version of Cryptocat. These critics include Thomas Ptacek, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn, Moxie Marlinspike and Jake Appelbaum.
Singel frames my criticism here as sexist. Meredith Patterson is a woman, whereas the Cryptocat critics I named were all men. Singel claims that, "Patterson, one of the all-too few female security researchers, doesn’t seem to count for much in Soghoian’s analysis." He adds later, "instead, Soghoian believes, Norton should have turned to one of four more vocal critics he names — all of them men."

As an initial matter, let me say that I have genuine respect for Meredith and her skills as a security researcher. We've known each other for several years, have attended several privacy conferences together, and have a shared goal in keeping the communications of users out of the prying hands of the government. Nowhere in my prior blog post do I dismiss Patterson's skills, credentials, or technical opinions.

My criticism of Norton's piece, in this respect, is not about the specific technical expert who is quoted as saying positive things about Cryptocat, but rather, the total lack of any dissenting quotes. If the rest of the security community were agnostic about the merits of Cryptocat, then it would perhaps be fine to quote a single technical expert who has positive things to say. In this case though, there are several technical experts who have deep concerns about the security of Cryptocat, experts whose research and views Wired has covered at length in the past.

As Singel has described it, I would have liked Norton to talk to a more more qualified expert, and to not print Patterson's opinions. That is not the case. I just think that a dissenting expert should be quoted too.

To summarize, the gender of the technical expert quoted saying positive things about Cryptocat has absolutely nothing at all to do with my belief that a responsible journalist would have spoken to, and quoted at least one technical expert who is critical of the tool. Even more so when the headline of the story is "This Cute Chat Site Could Save Your Life and Help Overthrow Your Government."

On the issue of privilege

In my blog post, I quoted from a few of Norton's recent tweets, in which she criticizes the crypto community, which she believes is filled with "privileged", "mostly rich 1st world white boys w/ no real problems who don't realize they only build tools [for] themselves."

After I published my blog post, Singel criticized me for quoting Norton's tweets, claiming that I was using "an outsider's critique of your boys club as a way to discredit them."

Although Singel clearly disagrees, I felt, and still feel that it is relevant to highlight the fact that Norton believes that the crypto community, and in particular, the critics of Cryptocat, are just privileged, paranoid geeks who have no real problems.

As I mentioned in my blog post, two of the most vocal critics of Cryptocat's web based chat app, Jake Appelbaum and Moxie Marlinspike, have faced pretty extreme real world problems of surveillance and government harassment.

After Appelbaum was outed by the press as as being associated with WikiLeaks, Twitter, Google and Sonic.net were forced to provide his communication records to the FBI as part of its investigation into WikiLeaks. At least one of Appelbaum's friends and colleagues has been forced to testify at a federal grand jury, and he has been repeatedly stopped at the border, harassed, and had digital devices seized by the authorities.

Likewise, for some time, Marlinspike was routinely stopped at the border by US authorities, had his laptop and phones searched, and in at least one case, was questioned by a US embassy official, who had a photo of Marlinspike at hand, before he could get on a plane back to the US.

While Appelbaum and Marlinspike have (thankfully) not been physically tortured by government agents, their paranoia and dedication towards improving the state of Internet security is by no means theoretical. Their concerns are legitimate, and their paranoia is justified.

On telling journalists to unplug

Singel's most vicious, yet totally unfair criticism relates to the two paragraphs that concluded my Cryptocat blog post:

Although human interest stories sell papers and lead to page clicks, the media needs to take some responsibility for its ignorant hyping of new security tools and services. When a PR person retained by a new hot security startup pitches you, consider approaching an independent security researcher or two for their thoughts. Even if it sounds great, please refrain from showering the tool with unqualified praise.

By all means, feel free to continue hyping the latest social-photo-geo-camera-dating app, but before you tell your readers that a new security tool will lead to the next Arab Spring or prevent the NSA from reading peoples' emails, step back, take a deep breath, and pull the power cord from your computer.

Singel states that the main point of my post "seemed to be to tell a woman to shut up and unplug from the net." He further twists my words by writing:
Moreover, Soghoian suggesting that if Quinn Norton ever wanted to write about about encryption tools in the future, she ought to "step back, take a deep breath, and pull the power cord from your computer" isn't just rude and obnoxious, it’s border-line sexist and an outright abuse of Soghoian's place in the computer security world."

The harsh words in my conclusion, which Singel quotes, were aimed at "the media." This of course includes Wired, but also many other journalists and news organizations who regularly publish stories on the latest new snake-oil product that uses "military-grade encryption."

In fact, the words "ignorant hyping" in the blog post's conclusion link to a recent New York Times article about Wickr, a new mobile app that the Times reveals will let "users transmit texts, photos and videos through secure and anonymous means previously reserved for the likes of the military and intelligence operatives."

(This is, of course, rubbish. There are no anonymity technologies that have been "reserved for the likes of the military and intelligence operatives.")

Finally, in support of his charge that I am sexist, Singel twists my words by stating that "Soghoian suggest[s] that if Quinn Norton ever wanted to write about about encryption tools in the future, she ought to 'step back, take a deep breath, and pull the power cord from your computer.'"

Let me be clear: Nowhere in my blog post do I tell Quinn that she should never again write about encryption tools. Instead, I warn journalists who are planning to write that "that a new security tool will lead to the next Arab Spring or prevent the NSA from reading peoples' emails." That is very different than "ever writing about encryption tools in the future."

Of course I want journalists to write about encryption, privacy, security and the importance of protecting data. I want users to be safe, and one of the best ways for them to discover and then adopt safe practices is by reading about them in the media.

(Strangely enough, Wired's chilling coverage this week of the devastating hack against Mike Mat Honan has been absolutely fantastic, offering a clear demonstration of how difficult it is for users to protect their data even when using tools and services created by billion dollar corporations.)

What I wish to avoid though, is news stories that hype technologies that simply cannot, and will not deliver what has been promised to users. By all means, please tell users about two-factor authentication, encrypted cloud backups with keys not known to providers, and VPN services. Just don't claim that these technologies will plunge the NSA into darkness or lead to the overthrow of authoritarian governments.

I do not hate female journalists

As an activist that uses media coverage to pressure companies to change their privacy invading practices, I regularly work with journalists around the world, feeding them stories, tips, and when they want them, quotes. In the more than six years that I have been working with the media (including Wired on countless occasions), never once has the gender of the reporter played any role in whether or not I went to them with a scoop, or returned their phone calls or emails.

The media are of course not equal in their understanding of technology or their willingness to dig deep into a tech issue. In my experience, gender plays absolutely no role in determining the quality of a tech journalist.

For example, of the entire news media, the What They Know team at the Wall Street Journal (Julia Angwin and Jennifer Valentino-DeVries) are by far the best in the business when it comes to covering privacy and security. They break major stories, do great investigative research, and routinely seek the confirmation of multiple technical experts in order to verify claims before they print them. On this beat, their coverage is first rate, and quite frankly, puts the New York Times, the Washington Post, Wired, Ars and others to shame. It is not surprising then, that when a great scoop lands in my lap, I take it to the WSJ first.

I judge, praise and criticize journalists on the tech beat based on the quality of their reporting, not by their gender. In this case, I criticized Quinn Norton's Wired story because it was deeply flawed, not because she is a woman. To claim otherwise is pure bullshit.